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I. EQUAL

PROTECTION

A. Criminal Prosecution of Sit-in Demonstrators
The prosecutions in McKinnie v. State,1 arose from "sit-in" demonstrations by which a group of Negroes attempted to obtain service
at a privately operated cafeteria in Nashville. The passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 has since been held by the United States
Supreme Court to abate these particular prosecutions2 and the
prospective application of its public accommodations provisions makes
it unlikely that their facts will recur. When a doorman refused to
allow them to enter the cafeteria because of its policy against serving
Negroes, the defendants congregated in a small vestibule and effectively blocked entrance and exit of other patrons. They were arrested
and charged with violations of section 39-1101(7) of the Tennessee
Code which prohibits "conspiracy . . . to commit any act injurious
to public health, public morals, trade, or commerce.. ." and section
62-711 which provides penalties for any person guilty of "turbulant
or riotous conduct within or about any hotel, inn, restaurant. .. "
A jury found the defendants guilty and each was sentenced by the
court to serve ninety days in the work-house and to pay a fine of
fifty dollars, despite the jury's recommendation that each be punished
only by a fine of less than fifty dollars.
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. 379 S.W.2d 214 (Tenn. 1964), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 811, rev'd, 85 Sup. Ct.
1101 (1965).
2. 85 Sup. Ct. 1101 (1965).
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In affirming the convictions, the Supreme Court of Tennessee
rejected a variety of constitutional claims made by appellants' thirteen
assignments of error, including alleged invalidity of the statutes and
indictments for vagueness, exclusion of Negroes from the jury, and
denial of rights of free speech. The most important issue was
whether due process and equal protection of the laws were denied
to the defendants by criminal prosecutions which enforce a private
owner's policy of racial discrimination3 The court avoided a decision
of this question by holding that the defendants' conduct was unlawful
and punishable under the particular statutes independently of factors
of race and discrimination. The court assumed arguendo that such
prosecutions might be invalid if based upon peaceable, non-violent
attempts to obtain service, but, on the factual record, it held that
defendants' actions contained elements of conspiracy, physical force
and riotousness4 which rendered them unlawful. In this posture, the
case presented to the court a simple instance of employment of unlawful means to a possibly legitimate end. The same reasoning
enabled the court to dispose of the free speech claim. The defendants' actions were compared to mass picketing in labor disputes
which loses the constitutional protection accorded to peaceful picketing because of the addition of the element of physical force to
those of communication and protest.
B. Racial Discriminationby Private Motel in Urban Renewal Project
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a judgment
of the United States District for the Middle District of Tennessee in
Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc.5 The lower court had held
that state and federal involvement in the development of Nashville's
Capitol Hill Redevelopment Project caused the operation of a motel
within it to be "state action" which was precluded from racial discrimination by both the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 6 The
appellate court withheld its decision until passage of the Civil Rights
3. A question which the United States Supreme Court has adeptly managed to
avoid by deciding upon other grounds a series of cases raising the issue. In Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), six justices addressed themselves to the question and
divided equally. Delaware is believed to be the only state whose highest court has
held such prosecutions to be unconstitutional. Delaware v. Brown, 195 A.2d 379 (Del.
1963).
4. The Supreme Court apparently disagreed with the Tennessee court's view of
this aspect of the case. In its per curiam order of reversal, supra note 2, it merely
cited Harm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964), which held that the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 abated pending prosecutions based upon nonforcible attempts to
gain admittance to or remain in establishments covered by the act.
5. 336 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1964).
6. 220 F. Supp. 1 (1963). This decision was reviewed at length in the last survey
article.
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Act of 1964 on the possibility that prospective voluntary compliance
with the act might bring a suggestion of mootness. When no such
suggestion was filed, the court affirmed the district court, but solely
on the basis of the fourteenth amendment. It modified the judgment
to eliminate the holding that the fifth amendment was also violated
because of the federal involvement, viewing this as unnecessary to
the decision. The Court of Appeals agreed that the use of state and
local public funds, the supervision by state agencies of the execution
of the Redevelopment Plan, and the continuing state controls were
sufficient state involvement to cause the fourteenth amendment to be
applicable. It emphasized, however, that its holding was not based
on the mere fact that a state agency had previously held title to the
property.
C. Racial Discrimination in Public Schools
The extended litigation aimed at desegregation of the Memphis
public schools went through another phase, but did not reach a conclusion. In Northcrossv. Board of Educationof the City of Memphis,7
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit again reversed a district
court ruling which had been favorable to the defendant School Board.
In 1962, the case was remanded to the district court with instructions
to enjoin the Board from operating a bi-racial school system or in the
alternative, to require it to adopt a desegregation plan. Over plaintiff's objections, the district court approved a plan submitted by the
Board which provided for new unitary school zones and grade-a-year
completion of desegregation over a seven year period.8 In reversing
the district court, the court of appeals held that it had erred in four
respects: (1) evidence of possible racial gerrymandering of school
zones was sufficient to place upon the Board the burden of proving
that zone lines were not drawn with a view to preserving a maximum
amount of segregation, and the district court was directed to take
further testimony on the criteria utilized by the Board in drawing
zones; (2) the rate of desegregation under the plan did not satisfy
current standards and the district court was directed to order complete desegregation of junior high schools in September of 1965 and
senior high schools in 1966; (3) following its previous holding in the
Chattanooga school case,9 the court held that pupils have standing
to raise the issue of desegregation of faculties because of the effects
upon their education of assignment of teachers by race; and (4) the
plan included an invalid transfer provision which allowed pupils in
schools attended by both races to transfer to other schools which did
7. 333 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1964).
8. The district court's action is reported at 8 RACE REL.L. REP. 1021 (1963).
9. Mapp v. Board of Educ., 319 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1963).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL, 18

not have full enrollment. Under the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in Goss v. Board of Education of Knoxville, ° this provision was unconstitutional because it permitted transfer only from
schools attended by both races and would not permit transfers to a
desegregated school from a school attended solely by one race. The
obvious tendency of the provisions to perpetuate segregated schools
was also cited as a grounds for reversal. The case was remanded to
the district court for further proceedings.
D. Apportionment of Representative Bodies
There were no reported decisions during the survey period in
the continuing federal court litigation concerning reapportionment of
the Tennessee legislature. However, the three-judge District Court,
in unreported orders, allowed the 1965 assembly of the Tennessee
legislature one further and final opportunity to take corrective action.
As this article is written, the regular session of the legislature has
adjourned without having acted, but it is to meet in extraordinary
session in May, 1965 to consider legislative reapportionment and
congressional redistricting. The court approved plans apportioning
both houses on a population basis, to be effective June 1, 1965, if the
legislature does not act.
The United States Supreme Court declined to review West v.
Carr," in which the Tennessee Supreme Court had refused to halt
the election of constitutional convention delegates pursuant to the
same formula of apportionment which had been held unconstitutional
for the legislature. In a per curiam order, the Court dismissed plaintiff's appeal for want of jurisdiction, possibly because the procedural
ground of the decision of the state supreme court was an adequate
and independent state law basis which precluded appeal as of right
from the unfavorable ruling on federal constitutional claims.' 2 In
the same order, the court treated the appeal as a petition for certiorari
and denied the writ. The decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
was criticized in last year's survey. 13
II. DUt

PRocEss OF LAw: REGULATION OF TnE

PRAcrlcE OF AccoulrANcy

The undisputed facts of State v. Bookkeeper's Business Service
10. 373 U.S. 683 (1963).

11. 212 Tenn. 367, 370 S.W.2d 469 (1963)

(appeal dismissed), cert. denied, 378

U.S. 557 (1964).

12. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945); McCoy v. Shaw, 277 U.S. 302 (1928).
13. Kirby, ConstitutionalLaw-1963 Tennessee Survey, 17 VAND. L. ltv.

(1964).

944, 956-59
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Co.,'4 show that the defendant corporation offers generally to small

businesses having a volume of sales less than 10,000 dollars per month
what it calls a "personalized bookkeeping and tax service." Defendant's agents perform services which include posting from a
customer's records to books of account; preparation of regular profit
and loss statements; filing of monthly and quarterly state and federal
tax returns including sales, excise, unemployment and social security
taxes; preparation of the annual federal income tax return; and, upon
request, furnishing of statements of net worth. Its advertising brochure represents that defendant gives the smaller merchant "the
same advantages that 'Big Business' receives through employing fulltime, highly trained tax experts and bookkeepers." To a businessman
who wishes to post his own books, the defendant offers to install a
bookkeeping system designed for his business, but the defendant will
prepare his tax returns. Without considering the clear potential for
harm if such services are rendered by unqualified persons, the Court
of Appeals for the Eastern Section concluded that legislative regulation of defendant's activity under the state police power would be
unconstitutional. Defendant was therefore held not to be engaged
in the practice of public accountancy within provisions of the Tennessee Code which define such practice, 5 requires examination and
licensing by the State Board of Accountancy, 16 and prohibit corporations from its pursuit.17
The court construed the definitive provision as including only persons who: (1) hold themselves out to the public as qualified to render
any of a number of specified accounting services; (2) perform such
services for more than one employer, and (3) represent themselves
as skilled in the practice of accounting either as a "public accountant"
or "certified public accountant." The court concluded that although
the defendant was within (1) and (2) because it represented itself
as qualified to render, and did actually render to more than one
employer, several of the enumerated statutory accounting services,
it was not within (3) because it did not use the magic words, "public
accountant" or "certified public accountant," but, instead, represented
itself as performing only "bookkeeping and similar technical services."18
The court conceded that the definition was subject to a broader
construction urged by the state which would have applied the acts
14. 382 S.W.2d 559 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1964). The supreme court denied certiorari.
15, TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-127 (Supp. 1964).
16. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-126 (Supp. 1964).
17. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-140 (Supp. 1964). The action sought only to enjoin the
corporation from engaging in the practice of accountancy.
18. 382 S.W.2d at 565.
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to a mere bookkeeper or accountant, if he performed any of the
enumerated services 19 except as an employee of one employer or in
part-time preparation of tax returns or bookkeeping. It rejected this
construction in order to save the constitutionality of the acts.20
A reading of the entire chapter of the code on regulation of accoimtants2' leaves little doubt that the legislature intended a comprehensive scheme of licensing and regulation of both certified public
accountants and non-certified accountants or bookkeepers who, like
the defendant, hold themselves out to the public as being generally
engaged in the business of performing any of the enumerated services.
The interpretation sought by the state may have been too broad,
but a decision which places this corporation outside the scope of the
state's police power is far too restrictive. At the minimum, the
legislature should be able to withhold from such an operation
the privilege of doing business in the corporate form. While the
decision merely denies an injunction against a corporation's engaging
in the regulated practices, its reasoning would totally insulate this
commercial activity from regulation in the public interest. The
complexity of modem business finances and the pitfalls in the handling
of tax matters by incompetents should enable the legislature to
reasonably determine that the public interest requires some regulation
of the type of commercial activity conducted by Bookkeepers Business
Service Company.
Although the court felt that its holding followed a majority of state
court decisions which have considered the issue,22 its reasoning is
contrary to the trend towards increased judicial deference to legislative determinations of factual need for economic regulations. The
court's approach is also in sharp contrast to that of most other Ten19. The services listed, including those performed by the defendant, appear to go
beyond mere bookkeeping or accounting. They are: "auditing; devising and installing
systems; recording and presentation of financial information or data; compiling tax
returns; preparing financial statements, schedules, reports, and exhibits for publication,
credit purposes, use in courts of law and equity, and for other purposes." True. CODE
ANN.§ 62-127 (Supp. 1964).
20. The constitutionality of the act as applied to one who admittedly held himself out
as a "public accountant" was upheld in Davis v. Allen, 43 Tenn. App. 278, 307
S.W.2d 800 (M.S. 1957), which emphasized the "holding out to the public" as the
justification for legislative regulation.
21. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-120 to-145 (Supp. 1964).
22. See Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 447 (1960). However, the main concern in this area
appears to have been legislation which totally prohibits a non-certified accountant from
practicing the profession of accountancy. So long as be does not use a statutory title,
"certified public accountant" or "public accountant," he is generally held to have a right
to practice his profession. 1 Am. Jur. 2d Accountants § 3 (1962). The Tennessee
legislation falls short of such a prohibition, supra note 19, and it bases regulability on
the nature of the accounting services offered to the public rather than upon the
label.
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nessee decisions during recent years. Except for questionable decisions that the police power does not permit legislative regulation of
the business of watch repairing and the sale of gasoline with
premiums, 24 Tennessee courts have been slow to strike down economic
regulations on due process grounds. The state's so-called "Fair Trade
Law" was upheld despite its sweeping impairment of property and
contract rights under a declaration that the court would not substitute
its judgment as to the reasonableness of a police power regulation
"unless it clearly appears to us that those regulations are beyond all
reasonable relation to the subject to which they are applied as to
amount to an arbitrary usurpation of power, or they are unmistakably
and palpably in excess of legislative power, or they are arbitrary
beyond all justice."25 Using the same language, the supreme court
upheld legislation which severely restricted the freedom of contract
of burial associations and insurance companies. 26 Similar restraint led
the court to uphold the legislative imposition of standard time upon the
entire state27 and to respect legislative decisions to regulate electricians,2 pawn brokers, and automobile distributors.- °
Bookkeepers Business Service conflicts even more sharply with the
trend of the United States Supreme Court away from overturning
state economic regulations under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.3 ' The opinion refers to unreasonable restriction
of the accountant's "right of private contract," a right which Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes put to rest as a specially protected freedom almost
23. Livesay v. Tennessee Bd. of Examiners, 204 Tenn. 500, 322 S.W.2d 209 (1959).
This decision is criticized by Overton, Constitutional Law-1959 Tennessee Survey, 12
VAND. L. REV. 1096 (1959).

24. State v. White, 199 Tenn. 544, 288 S.W.2d 428 (1956), criticized by Sanders,
ConstitutionalLaw-1956 Tennessee Survey, 9 VAND. L. REV. 943 (1956).
25. McKesson & Robbins v. Government Employees Dep't Store, Inc., 211 Tenn. 494,
499, 365 S.W.2d 890, 892 (1963).
26. Cosmopolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Northington, 201 Tenn. 541, 300 S.W.2d 911
(1957).
27. Phillips v. State, 202 Tenn. 402, 304 S.W.2d 614 (1957).
28. Hughes v. Board of Commrs, 204 Tenn. 298, 319 S.W.2d 481 (1958).
29. Epstein v. State, 211 Tenn. 663, 366 S.W.2d 914 (1963).
30. Ford Motor Co. v. Pace, 206 Tenn. 559, 335 S.W.2d 360 (1960).
31. The defendant alleged unconstitutionality only under two state constitutional
provisions. However, the "law of the land" clause, TumN. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, is generally treated as synonymous with "due process of law," Roberts v. Brown, 43 Tenn.
App. 565, 310 S.W.2d 197 (W.S. 1957), and the "class legislation" clause, TENN.
CoNsT. art. XI, § 8, is equivalent to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Memphis v. State ex rel. Ryals, 133 Tenn. 83, 179 S.W. 631 (1915).
Nonetheless, the courts of Tennessee and most states are generally more restrictive of
legislative power to regulate economic activity than are federal courts. See Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 Nw. U.L. REv.
226 (1958); Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MNN.
L. RBv. 91 (1950).
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thirty years ago in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,2 when he said:
In each case the violation alleged by those attacking minimum wage regulation for women is deprivation of freedom of contract. What is this freedom?
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty
and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In
prohibiting that deprivation, the Constitution does not recognize an absolute
and uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its history and
connotation. But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization
which requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the
health, safety, morals and welfare of the people. Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraint of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the
interest of the community is due process.

Nor does the Constitution of Tennessee speak of "freedom of contract." It did not prevent the state supreme court, in Ford Motor Co.
v. Pace from upholding far-reaching regulation of the distribution of

automobiles which not only controlled the terms of future contracts,
but which abrogated existing franchise agreements between manufacturers and dealers by imposing different mutual obligations upon

them. The court's holding that the automobile industry could reasonably be found by the legislature to sufficiently affect Tennessee's
economy to justify regulation under the police power was noted in
this survey as a commendable deference to legislative determination
of the need for regulation of a business pursuit.4 The present case
must be viewed as retrogression to a judicial attitude which substitutes

a court's judgment for that of the legislature. This legislation would
undoubtedly be upheld in the federal courts. Some may find a certain
irony in comparing the reasoning of this case with that of the United
States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, when it

held that the fourteenth amendment was not offended by a Kansas
statute which limited the business of debt adjusting to lawyers:
We conclude that the Kansas Legislature was free to decide for itself that
legislation was needed to deal with the business of debt adjusting. Unquestionably, there are arguments showing that the business of debt adjusting
has social utility, but such arguments are properly addressed to the legislature, not to us. We refuse to sit as a 'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom
of legislation,' and we emphatically refuse to go back to the time when
courts used the Due Process Clause 'to strike down state laws, regulatory of
business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident,
or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.' Nor are we able or
willing to draw lines by calling a law 'prohibitory' or 'regulatory.' Whether
32. 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
33. Ford Motor Co. v. Pace, supra note 30.
34. Kirby, Constitutional Law-1961 Tennessee Survey, 14
1178 (1961).

VAND.

L. REv. 1171,
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the legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Lord
Keynes, or some other is no concern of ours. The Kansas debt adjusting
statute may be wise or unwise. But relief, if any be needed, lies not with
35
us but with the body constituted to pass laws for the State of Kansas.

Perhaps a different philosophy is justified in Tennessee because of
outmoded legislative machinery which does not permit the sort of
factual inquiries and deliberative legislative procedures which are
presupposed by such notions as "presumption of constitutionality,"
"conceivable rational basis," "judicial restraint," and deference to
legislative judgments on debatable issues. If so, there should be
greater consistency in following the opposite approach than is shown
by Tennessee decisions of the past decade.
III. LEGISLATIE DELEGATION TO AD M usTATIVE AGENcY

Section 49-233 of the Tennessee Code delegates to the State Board
of Education the power to establish standards for new school systems
of cities and special districts. A private act had created a special district for one civil district of Perry County although the County
Board of Education had determined that the schools of that district
should be consolidated with a city system. The State Board of
Education ruled that there was an insufficient number of students in
the proposed special district to justify affording adequate educational
opportunities under the Board's standards. In Lobelville School District v. McCanless, the supreme court affirmed a Davidson County
Chancery Court judgment holding the statute under which the Board
acted to be a valid legislative delegation. The court found sufficient
statutory standards to guide the Board in establishing school district
standards and ruling upon proposed systems. One factor to be
considered by the Board is the willingness of the people of the district to raise sufficient local funds for such schools as indicated by
majority vote in a referendum. The court reaffirmed its rule that no
legislative act may be framed so that its efficacy is derived from a
popular vote, but viewed this referendum as merely a factor to be
considered by the Board and not binding upon it.
IV. CoNsTrruT ONAL OFmcECs: EFF~cr OF METROPOLITAN CHARm

In three cases, the supreme court considered the effects of the
Nashville metropolitan charter upon offices established by the state
constitution, with results favorable to the charter. In Robinson v.
35. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963).
36. 381 S.W.2d 273 (Tenn. 1964).
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Briley,37 the court upheld provisions transferring certain functions of
the Davidson County Trustee to the metropolitan treasurer and requiring that the Trustee remit daily all funds collected by him. The
Trustee argued unsuccessfully that the constitution preserved his rights
to retain the fees and functions of his office as they existed under North
Carolina law when the original Tennessee Constitution created this
office. Provisions of article 11, section 9 of the 1953 amendments to
the constitution authorizing
"the consolidation of any and all functions" of local government and provisions
of the implementing statute that no officer "shall retain any right, power, duty
or obligation unless this chapter or the charter of the metropolitan government
shall expressly provide, or unless such retention and continuation be required by

the constitution of Tennessee"3 8 were construed to authorize the disputed reorganization of official functions.

The holding follows naturally from previous decisions that the
duties and functions of the constitutional officers are to be prescribed
by statute 9 and that the metropolitan charter has the effect of
40
legislation.
In Glasgow v. Fox,4' the court held that the office of constable was
not abolished merely by the absence of any charter provision expressly
retaining it, but the court refused to decide unnecessarily the question
of whether a constitutional office could be abolished by express
charter provision. This question was answered in the negative by
dictum in MetropolitanGovernment of Nashville and Davidson County
v. Poe.4 The court upheld provisions of the charter which transferred
to the metropolitan chief of police the powers of the sheriff as principal
conservator of the peace and law enforcement officer of the county,
leaving him his powers as custodian of the jail, and also held him
subject to general functional, budgetary and purchasing provisions of
the charter. Although unnecessary to its holding, the statement of
the court that the charter could not validly abolish a constitutional
office reinforces prior indications that the charter has the dignity of
a statute and that its provisions are equally subject to constitutional
limitations.
37. 374 S.W.2d 382 (Tenn. 1963).
38. TENN. CODE Amx. § 6-3702 (Supp. 1964).
39. Redistricting Cases, 111 Tenn. 234, 80 S.W. 750 (1903); Judges' Cases, 102
-Tenn. 509, 53 S.W. 134 (1899).
40. Winter v. Allen, 212 Tenn. 84, 367 S.W.2d 785 (1963).
41. '383 S.W.2d 9 (Tenn. 1964).
42. 383 S.W.2d 265 (Tenn. 1964).
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V. MISCELLANEOUS

A. Constitutionalityof Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act43
In Martin v. Martin,4 the supreme court added another to the long
line of cases upholding legislative enactments against challenges of
violation of the state constitutional prohibition against special legislation which suspends the general law.4 5 A circuit court had dismissed
a proceeding under the act by a non-resident mother against a
Tennessee father which sought enforcement of a Michigan court order
requiring him to furnish monetary support for his three children.
The provisions of the act authorizing the filing of such petitions by
non-residents on paupers oath and certification of records of judicial
proceedings of another state according to the laws of that state are
both departures from general Tennessee law and for this reason the
circuit judge held the act unconstitutional. The supreme court
reversed, applying familar principles that legislative classifications will
be upheld if any rational basis for them can be conceived. The
probable impoverished condition of minor children for whom such
petitions would be filed and the public interest in minimizing procedural difficulties in the institution and proof of such petitions were
readily held to be rational bases for the special provisions.
B. Civil Rights Action for Slander by Public Officials
In Hopkins v. Wasson, the defendants, who were school officials
of Bradley County, were granted summary judgment in a federal
court action by a discharged school teacher based upon Federal
Civil Rights Acts. The plaintiff had combined counts based upon
common law slander and the Civil Rights Acts, apparently under the
theory that slander by public officials was within an old provision
which incorporated state common law in addition to the laws of the
United States where the latter did not provide suitable remedies
in a civil rights action.47 This provision was held to be purely
procedural for the purpose of remedies. Violation of a specific
right derived from, or secured by, the Constitution or laws of the
United States is an essential element of an action under the Civil
Rights Acts. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court and
affirmed in a memorandum opinion.4
43. TENN.CODE ANN.§§ 36-901 to -929 (Supp. 1964).

44. 373 S.W.2d 609 (Tenn. 1964).
45. TEN. CONST. art. XI, § 8. See note 31 supra.
46. 227 F. Supp. 278 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), aff'd, 329 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1964).
47. Rev. Stat. § 1988 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1958).
48. 329 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1964).

